INDIA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP: WHY THEY ARE NOT FRIENDS?

Professor Kanti Bajpai’s latest offering ‘India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends’ (2021) analyses the relationship between the two of the oldest civilisational nations of Asia through the prism of four Ps – perception, perimeters, partnerships and power. His principal submission is that the current stand-off between the two nations is rooted in a historical perception of each other fuelled by deep elite mistrust; differences over interpretation of territorial perimeters stretching the mighty Himalayas, plateau, valleys and waterways; strategic partnerships with big powers – the United States (US) and Russia; and the growing power asymmetry between the nations in terms of Comprehensive National Power.

Perception

In his book ‘How China Sees India and the World’ (2022) Shyam Saran writes that India and China, despite occupying space in same neighbourhood, historically have been ‘strangers to one another’. Bajpai’s book gives a historical context of this neighbours-yet-strangers situation and how it created negative perception of each other to the effect of long-standing mistrust and lack of people-to-people interaction between the two nations.

The earliest recorded interaction between India and China was cultural – the rise of Buddhism in China and India as the land of origin of this faith. Yet, as Bajpai quotes various sources, the welcoming of Buddhism in China was not all friendly and revelational. There was ‘Sinification of the religion’ to suit the Chinese way of life and the original Indian influence waned away. In fact there was hostility towards Buddhism as ‘foreign religion’ among believers of Daoism who argued that Laozi-the founder of Daoism- was the Buddha.

The cultural interaction turned to trade relationship, particularly maritime trade, between 10th century CE to 16th century CE. However the trade relation did not lead to community relationship as most of it occurred through intermediaries in Central Asia (for China) and South-east Asia (for India).

Such limited historical engagement turned into solid negative perception in the 19th-20th centuries as the imperial Britain linked the countries through invasion and trade. Following the Opium Wars, Indian involvement in Opium trade with support of the British increased leading to various commercial disputes with the locals in China. In the late 19th century the Chinese intellectual class based on European and Japanese accounts of India developed an impression that India’s internal weakness more than British imperialism was the root cause of its decline. Contrary to this, the Chinese business communities in Bengal did not face aversion from local Indians. India’s intellectual class viewed China as a fellow Asian country subject to imperialism and there was a call for Asian Unity in which China was seen as major force.

Bajpai notes that the contrasting perceptions of each other further deteriorated after the 1962 War. In India, the mass media has been projecting China as major security threat for India with inherent jingoistic and racist aspersion. In the policy sphere, the ‘Great Power’ view as the dominant perspective does not see a peaceful and tranquil relationship between the two nations. China would attempt to undermine Indian power both materially as well as symbolically to deny it great power status.

Meanwhile Chinese perception of India, as Bajpai shows, has moved towards denial of significance. In Chinese scheme of world power hierarchy, India is an arriviste power in the second tier at the most. In fact, for China India’s significance lies in the US-China rivalry as the partner of the States in its neighbourhood and not as a ‘fellow great power’.

Bajpai argues that the little knowledge-negative perception of each other has made reconciliation difficult.

Perimeters

If territory is a prime mark of sovereignty, India and China cannot become friends until the unresolved territorial perimeters – agreement over boundary, status of Tibet, and militarisation of forward areas – find a lasting solution. Bajpai while giving a chronological background to it, much known to all, offers four reasons as to why permanent resolution of perimeter is rather difficult or in his own words, ‘Another confrontation along the border is therefore quite possible’ (p.136) even if ‘…full-scale war is unlikely’(p.137).

First, there is deep mistrust and miscommunication between the power pillars of Beijing and New Delhi. According to Bajpai, the lack of rich historical diplomatic exchange and events in the formative years of the post-independence diplomatic relationship (Political asylum to Dalai Lama and Tibetan Government in Exile, Forward Policy of 1961, and 1962 War) have led to a situation such that neither country trusts each other’s intentions despite increased high-level interaction in recent times.

Second, India and China have a zero-sum view of security. The militarisation of troops along forward posts and failure to achieve disengagement despite multiple rounds of talks post Doklam show that there is little room for compromise or concession necessary for any successful resolution of boundary dispute.

Third, Bajpai believes that Beijing and New Delhi have ‘cognitive dissonance’ (p.134) fuelled by pre-existing negative perception and mistrust. The confidence-building measures such as information exchange on river water have proved futile to the extent actions and statements on both sides are viewed with much cynicism and accusation of transparency.

Finally, Bajpai argues that the territorial question in both countries are affected by nationalist domestic opinion. Political leadership in Beijing and New Delhi have used jingoistic territorial statement for political gains at the cost of border dispute resolution.

In their book Pax Sinica (2019), Samir Saran and Akhil Deo argue that the Doklam episode indicates the beginning of a new phase in India-China relationship ‘where sharp tensions will punctuate the periods of peace’. Bajpai’s four-fold argumentation also indicates that military skirmishes along the border and post-Dalai Lama Tibet will remain fracture points in the foreseeable future.

Partnership

According to Kanti Bajpai, the India-China hostility has been shaped by their partnerships with the US and USSR/Russia since the beginning of the Cold War. He analyses the power interaction and partnerships among the four in two broad periods – from 1949 to 1988 and from 1988 to present. In the first period, India officially maintained Non-Alignment policy though it tilted towards the USSR. India partnered with the Soviets against China. In the second period, after a brief India-China entente against the America, hegemony in early 1990s, the US has become a major partner for India and China has drawn closer to Russia.

In his book On China (2011), Henry Kissinger has described the US-China relationship as ‘combative co-existence’ referring to great power rivalry between the two nations marked by sporadic cooperation such as the Phase One trade deal in 2020.

The containment of China in the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key area of convergence in the Indo-US relationship. On the other hand, China-Russia partnership is based on shared antagonism towards West-led World Order. For China, India-US partnership is also an ideological challenge – liberal democracy against an authoritarian Communist system. While India is not a great power rival for China, it is US endorsement of Indian interests that concerns China.

Aware of Russia-China strategic partnership and implications in world politics, India has concentrated on strengthening Defence and Energy ties with Russia. India-Russia agreement on energy cooperation in the Far East – historically an area of China-Russia hostility- is an attempt to balance China.

According to Bajpai, it is evident that India and China have always been on opposite camps when it comes to the two big powers of the world. This implies that there is no common diplomatic points of convergence for India and China when it comes to the world powers. In a unipolar world, it is US-India against China and in a multi-polar world India practices multi-alignment against China’s aspiration for numero uno. This contrasting worldview, according to Bajpai, meant that India and China have ‘no history of working closely together, of building a stock of strategic knowledge and trust between them’ (p.143). It only adds to mutual mistrust and miscommunication between the two nations.

Power

‘India and China are far apart on power’ (p.219). The comprehensive national power – the combination of economic, military, and soft power – between Beijing and New Delhi is far wide and growing. Economically, India is USD 12 trillion behind China. In 2022 India-China trade amounted to USD 136 billion where India had a trade decilitre of USD 100 billion. In terms of soft power, China’s diplomatic influence is far stronger than India. As per the Lowy Institute survey, as quoted by Bajpai, India ranks sixth and China ranks first among twenty five Asian powers. In other aspects of soft power such as cultural influence too, China is making inroads globally. Militarily, China’s annual Defense budget is only second to the US.

Bajpai argues that ‘until India substantially closes the power gap, there is little prospect of a lasting rapprochement’ (p.220). In a superior position, China will be assertive and will be less accommodative of India’s interests. In an inferior position as the power gap reveals, India will lack the bargaining power to fulfill its interests.

While offering the four-P structural framework to understand India-China relationship, Bajpai argues that the only P where India can seek a permanent solution is balancing the power dynamics with China. India will have to build the ‘soft, hard, and social infrastructure for the determined, responsible pursuit of power which it will need if it wants to catch up with China’ (p.239). It is possible to develop institutions, rules, ideas, military, energy, education, health based on social justice and equality for a country through its domestic policies. Bajpai thus offers a ‘near-civilisational change’ (p.240) of India before it takes on China.

However, what about finding paths for the immediate navigation? Bajpai’s book does not answer this question.

Photo courtesy: Xinhuanet